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Section 28 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006 provides that any conveyance of 
land held in a joint tenancy by a joint tenant without the prior consent in writing of the other joint 
tenant(s) is void [1]  unless such consent is dispensed with by the court under s.29(2)(d). [2]  If a 
property is owned by two joint tenants this provision will, when enacted, prevent one of them 
unilaterally severing the joint tenancy by executing a conveyance of his interest to a nominal third 
party to hold to the use of himself as a tenant in common. Currently, the Statute of Uses (Ireland) 1634 
operates to execute such a use ensuring that this co-owner receives a legal interest by virtue of the 
conveyance to uses. However, as he now holds his interest pursuant to the latter deed and not the 
original assurance, unity of title and time are destroyed. His interest in the property is therefore 
severed, with the result that he now holds an undivided moiety in the property as a tenant in common. 
Section 28 will also invalidate the two-step assurance required where a joint tenant wishes to 
unilaterally sever a joint tenancy over leasehold land. The Statute of Uses does not apply to leaseholds 
and to achieve the same effect the joint tenant must assign his interest to a third party who 
immediately assigns this interest back to him as a tenant in common. 
  
Unilateral severance of a joint tenancy destroys the right of survivorship and converts the arrangement 
into a tenancy in common, permitting the severing joint tenant to make a will leaving his moiety to 
whomever he wishes. After the severing joint tenant dies, his successor becomes a co-owner and, as 
the law currently stands, he will be able to force a sale of the property on the surviving co-owner by 
bringing an action pursuant to s.4 of the Partition Acts 1868 and 1876. Section 28 of the 2006 Bill is 
based on a 2004 Law Reform Commission recommendation that unilateral severance be prohibited. [3]  
The Commission noted that with a joint tenancy each joint tenant has the chance of ultimately ending 
up with the entire property through the right of survivorship. It seemed unjust to the Commission “that 
a joint tenant may be deprived of this chance by the unilateral actions of a fellow joint tenant.” [4]  The 
Commission also described the current law as flying “in the face of the basic idea of contract law … 
that agreements freely entered into should be honoured.” [5]  Professor John Mee, in an article recently 
published in this journal, [6]  argued that unilateral severance should be retained. He suggested that 
s.28 should be deleted from the Bill and that the introduction of a notification requirement for an 
effective unilateral severance should be considered at a future date. [7]  This article seeks to examine in 
more detail the case for the abolition of unilateral severance. 
  
As Professor Mee notes, the severance of a joint tenancy has been possible for many centuries. [8]  The 
unilateral severance by a joint tenant of his interest through a conveyance to uses or an assurance to a 
strawman coupled with a re-conveyance back to the co-owner is regarded as acceptable in many 
jurisdictions across the common law world. In more recent times, the need for a conveyance to uses or 
a strawman transaction has been eradicated by judicial decision or by legislation in a number of 
jurisdictions and a self-conveyance, [9]  a notice in writing served on the other joint tenant [10]  or the 
registration of a declaration of severance in the land registry [11]  will now suffice. Academics have 
noted a movement away from formalism and an insistence on the destruction of one or more of the 
unities towards an approach which upholds the intention of the party who wishes to sever. [12]  In 
Ireland, conveyancers are still relying on conveyances to uses and strawman transactions [13]  to effect 
a severance at common law. Regardless of whether unilateral severance should be permitted, if both 
joint tenants agree that they wish to hold as tenants in common they should no longer be required to 
use such cumbersome and archaic devices to formally regularise their position. Fortunately, once the 
Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006 is enacted, a simple deed of conveyance will achieve 
the same effect. [14]   
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The tenancy by entireties 
  
Against the backdrop of this widespread acceptance of unilateral severance it is interesting to note that 
an alternative form of joint tenancy, known as a tenancy by entireties, is available to married couples 
in many jurisdictions in the United States which confers an indestructible right of survivorship. While 
a joint tenancy is described as requiring the four unities of title, time, interest and possession, the 
tenancy by entireties involves a fifth unity, namely, the unity of person between a husband and his 
wife. This estate evolved because the common law regarded a husband and wife who purchased 
property together as a single unit of ownership. Indeed, the tenancy by entireties was not originally 
regarded as a type of concurrent ownership as technically there was only one tenant. [15]  Due to the 
inferior legal status of married women before the nineteenth century, the husband was considered to be 
that tenant. [16]  He had exclusive control over the land and he alone possessed the right to alienate it, 
although he could not do so without her assent. This unity of person also meant that the “whole must 
remain to the survivor”. [17]  In Ireland, it seems to be generally accepted that the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1882 , which recognised the legal capacity of married women with respect to property, 
prevented the creation of any new tenancy by entireties after 1882. [18]  In England, “the flickering 
flame was snuffed out altogether” [19]  by ss.37 [20]  and 39(6) [21]  of the Law of Property Act 1925 . In 
the United States, although there were diverging views on the impact of the enactment of the married 
women’s property legislation on the tenancy by entireties, [22]  in a substantial number of 
jurisdictions [23]  the estate seems to have “survived the earthquake” [24]  although without its original 
sexist incidents. [25]  A unique feature of the estate is its indestructibility by a unilateral act of either 
spouse. It cannot be severed through alienation and neither can one party bring a partition action in 
relation to the property. [26]  In a number of jurisdictions, tenancies by entireties are also recognised as 
creating “impregnable fortresses against the claims of an individual spouse’s creditors.” [27]  This 
exemption can be abused since any property can be held as a tenancy by entirety although the purpose 
of the exemption was obviously to prevent families from being forced out of the marital home due to 
the financial difficulties of one spouse. [28]  The tenancy by entireties can be terminated by a joint 
conveyance to a third party and most jurisdictions also allow termination by mutual assent or a 
conveyance of the interest of one spouse to the other. [29]  Divorce or annulment usually transforms the 
tenancy by entireties into a tenancy in common although the execution of a separation agreement by 
the spouses, which does not show an intention to terminate the estate, will not sever it. [30]   
  
Although the tenancy by entireties has many critics, [31]  its ability to preserve the family home has 
also been recognised and some academics have discussed whether the estate or something similar to it 
should be extended to same sex and unmarried opposite sex couples. [32]  Carrozzo proposes the 
introduction of a new tenancy which resembles a modified tenancy in common with dual life 
estates. [33]  Tenants would hold in undivided equal shares but the surviving tenant would also possess 
a life estate in the other tenant’s moiety which would only be triggered on the latter’s death. The life 
estate ensures that the original intention to preserve the family residence is not frustrated as it prevents 
the successors of the deceased co-owner from bringing a partition action. The interest of the 
successors of the deceased co-owner would not be activated until the survivor dies. The estate also 
protects the interests of the successors of both co-owners as on the death of the surviving co-owner 
they can inherit their shares in the property. [34]  Although arguments for clarifying or extending the 
law on unilateral severance of joint tenancies seem to be very fashionable, [35]  the continued existence 
of the tenancy by entireties and these proposals for the creation of something similar for unmarried 
couples illustrate that support also exists for the notion of a joint tenancy which cannot be unilaterally 
severed. 
  
  
Unilateral severance in Ireland 
  
Although the current law in Ireland permits unilateral severance, it is important to consider the context 
in which this law is operating. Professor Mee speculates that some or many people entering into a joint 
tenancy understand that the survivor will take the property but fail to realise that the other joint tenant 
may prevent this happening by severing the joint tenancy during her life. [36]  This may indicate that 
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many practitioners are unaware that it is possible to unilaterally sever a joint tenancy. [37]  It seems 
likely that the last time most solicitors would have heard that a conveyance to uses may be used to 
unilaterally sever a joint tenancy was during a land law lecture while they were at university. A 
solicitor may not remember this in the context of a purchase by or a dispute between married or 
cohabiting co-owners. It is only recently that conveyancers are being encouraged to consider and 
advise on the implications of a breakdown in the relationship between purchasing co-owners and, to-
date, the emphasis has been on promoting the execution of co-ownership agreements. Laffoy’s Irish 
Conveyancing Precedents includes two deeds of severance in the format of a conveyance to uses of a 
fee simple interest and a two-step strawman transaction in relation to a leasehold interest. As they are 
designed to be executed by both joint tenants, a rushed practitioner could easily assume that a 
severance is not possible without the consent of the other joint tenant. Professor Mee recommends 
deleting s.28 of the Bill, “taking comfort in the short term in the fact that our close neighbours in 
England and Wales have appeared unconcerned about the potential problems resulting from unilateral 
severance.” [38]  This author would suggest that in England and Wales joint tenants are operating on a 
more level playing field than in Ireland. The references to the possibility of unilateral severance are 
less oblique in English textbooks catering to practitioners [39]  and, therefore, they are better equipped 
to advise a joint tenant on this issue in the event of a relationship breakdown. English conveyancers 
are not required to use the archaic conveyance to uses to sever a joint tenancy but may instead avail of 
the more modern notice of severance, [40]  which was specifically designed for unilateral severance. As 
Irish practitioners may not have been in a position to adequately advise on this issue, this author 
suspects that the right to unilaterally sever may not have been utilised by many joint tenants. It could 
even be argued that it is unlikely to be missed! Although this article will argue that unilateral 
severance is not the best way to deal with a co-ownership relationship which has turned sour, it is clear 
that if it is to be retained, conveyancers should be better appraised of the law, including the danger that 
it may not be effective in certain situations. 
  
  
The impact of section 3 of the Family Home Protection Act 1976 
  
The Circuit Court case, McCarthy v McCarthy,  [41]  concerned an attempted unilateral severance of a 
joint tenancy of a family home and a 58-acre farm in the joint names of a husband and wife. By a deed 
dated December 16, 1983 the wife transferred her interest in the property to a third party unto and to 
the use of herself. By her will of the same date she purported to devise her undivided share in the 
property as tenant in common to her children. Despite Sheridan J.’s considerable sympathy for the 
wife, he held that the deed of severance was void by reason of s.3(1) of the Family Home Protection 
Act 1976 . [42]  Section 3 provides that “where a spouse, without the prior consent in writing of the 
other spouse, purports to convey any interest in the family home to any person except the other 
spouse, then … the purported conveyance shall be void.” Sheridan J. commented that the harshness of 
the 1976 Act in relation to joint tenancies may not have been appreciated when it was originally 
enacted. Although there is no equivalent English legislation, it is interesting to consider the antipathy 
towards unilateral severance of the marital home expressed by Lord Denning M.R. in Bedson v 
Bedson  [43]  : 
  
“So long as the house is in the possession of the husband and wife as joint tenants or of 
one of them, there can be no severance of their equitable interests … Neither of them can 
sell his or her equitable interest separately. If he or she could do so, it would mean that the 
purchaser could insist on going into possession himself with the other spouse there which 
is absurd. It would mean also that one of them could, of his own head, destroy the right of 
survivorship which was the essence of the joint tenancy. That cannot be correct.” 
  
Although Lord Denning M.R. was mistaken on this issue, he clearly felt that to permit a unilateral 
severance of a joint tenancy over a family home would be harsh and unjust. 
  
Professor Mee describes Sheridan J.’s decision in McCarthy as a “somewhat unsatisfactory piece of 
legislative interpretation” as it does not advance the aim of the Act, which is to protect the spouse’s 
right to occupy the family home. This right is not affected where the other spouse, through a unilateral 
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conveyance to uses converts the joint tenancy of the family home into a tenancy in common. [44]  It is 
true that the spouse’s right to occupy is not endangered while the severing spouse lives. Unity of 
possession is preserved and, because of the approach taken by the courts in O’D v O’D , [45]  the 
severing spouse will not be able to force a sale of the family home pursuant to the Partition Acts 1868 
and 1876. However, if the wife was forced to leave the family home because of her husband’s 
domestic violence and he then executed a deed of severance before dying shortly afterwards, the wife 
may be prevented from re-occupying the property if Sheridan J.’s approach is not taken. If the 1976 
Act does not operate to invalidate the deed, her husband’s successors become entitled to his undivided 
moiety and they could force a sale of the property pursuant to s.4 of the Partition Acts. [46]  Although 
s.56 of the Succession Act 1965 confers on a surviving spouse the right to appropriate the family home 
in or towards satisfaction of that spouse’s legal right share or her share on intestacy, it only operates in 
relation to a dwelling in which the surviving spouse was ordinarily resident at the time of the 
deceased’s death. In contrast, the Family Home Protection Act 1976 defines a “family home” as 
including a dwelling in which a spouse ordinarily resided before leaving the other spouse. [47]  
Sheridan J.’s interpretation of the 1976 Act could, therefore, be construed in such circumstances as 
preserving the spouse’s right to re-occupy the family home following the death of the other joint 
tenant. Unfortunately, the 1976 Act will be of no assistance to her if her husband executed the deed of 
severance more than six years before his death as, unless the spouse is in occupation, s.54(1) of the 
Family Law Act 1995 provides that proceedings to have a conveyance declared void may not be 
instituted more than six years after the date of the conveyance. Therefore, a loophole seems to be 
available to the stealthier separated co-owner who effects a severance well in advance of his or her 
death. In other jurisdictions there is conflicting case law on whether legislation similar to our Family 
Home Protection Act 1976 invalidates a deed of severance executed by one spouse in relation to the 
matrimonial home [48]  and a future Irish court could reject the approach taken by Sheridan J. in 
McCarthy. In New Zealand the matter has been put beyond doubt by s.9(2)(proviso) of the Joint 
Family Homes Act 1964 , which provides that neither spouse may sever the statutory joint tenancy 
under which a registered joint family home is held. [49]  It is most unsatisfactory to allow a question 
mark to remain over the validity of such deeds of severance given that this is one of the most likely 
scenarios in which a severance may be contemplated. 
  
  
Secret unregistered deeds—The requirement for delivery of the deed and the potential 
for fraud 
  
The fact that the current law creates the potential for fraud has been raised on a number of 
occasions. [50]  Professor Mee discusses a typical scenario where X and Y are living together and are 
joint tenants of their family home. [51]  X executes a severance deed, which is left unregistered, and 
places it in a safety deposit box, along with a will leaving everything to a child from a previous 
relationship. If X dies first, then the severance deed will be found and its effect will be that Y will be 
entitled only to a one-half share under a tenancy in common, with X’s child taking the other one-half 
share. On the other hand, if Y dies first, X can simply destroy the secret severance deed and take the 
entire property by virtue of the operation of the right of survivorship. As Professor Mee notes, [52]  our 
courts could follow the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Sammon  [53]  which held that 
the requirement for the delivery of the deed was not satisfied in such circumstances. The husband, who 
was separated from his wife, the other joint tenant, executed a conveyance of his interest in the joint 
tenancy to the use of himself and delivered it to his solicitor but requested that it not be registered until 
after his death in case his wife discovered what he had done. Following his death, the court held that 
the deed was ineffective to sever the joint tenancy as there was no clear proof that he intended to be 
immediately and unconditionally bound by the deed. [54]  The inference was that he intended it only to 
become operative in the event that he predeceased the wife, in which case the deed amounted to an 
invalid attempt to defeat the right of survivorship by a testamentary disposition. The court also 
commented that: “in the absence of proof that the deceased intended to be bound by the document at 
the time of signing it there would be nothing wrong with any subsequent destruction of it.” [55]  In 
contrast, in an earlier decision, Burke v Stevens , [56]  the California Court of Appeal was satisfied that 
an immediate intention to pass title to one-half of the joint tenancy property was present in connection 
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with the secret unrecorded severance deed. The court dismissed the argument by counsel that if the 
non-severing party had died first, nothing would have been said about the unrecorded deed and the 
severing joint tenant would have become the owner of the entire land. The court held that fraud could 
not be contingently assumed and described the nefarious scenario suggested by counsel as pure guess 
and contrary to the presumption of fair dealing. [57]   
  
It is difficult to predict whether an Irish court would be satisfied that a secret, unregistered deed of 
severance was “delivered” and it is submitted that much will depend on the attendance taken by the 
severing joint tenant’s solicitor and whether it indicated an intention that the deed was to be 
immediately effective. If the joint tenant intended the deed to be operative only in the event that he 
predeceased the other joint tenant, there is a danger that it will be treated as an invalid attempt to 
defeat the right of survivorship by a testamentary disposition. [58]  A joint tenant could, however, avoid 
this danger by creating a future fee simple in favour of the person he wishes to benefit on his death, 
which is contingent on him pre-deceasing the other joint tenant and limited to take effect in possession 
on his death. [59]  Currently, he would be required to create this interest behind a use or a trust in order 
to avoid the common law contingent remainder rules, which prohibit springing interests. [60]  Swenson 
and Degnan note that if such a deed is delivered to the third party during the grantor’s lifetime, it will 
effect a severance. [61]  This approach, they claim: 
  
“… is not inconsistent with the cases dealing with testamentary dispositions because the 
conveyance of the future interest is a present, irrevocable transfer. It is no more 
testamentary than any fee to commence in possession upon the death of the 
conveyor.” [62]   
  
Therefore, it would appear that through astute drafting and the inter vivos delivery of the deed to the 
person to benefit, a joint tenant can benefit from the right of survivorship, if the other joint tenant pre-
deceases him, but also ensure severance in the event that he dies first. He can effectively “have his 
cake and eat it”. The only disadvantage associated with such a deed is that it is irrevocable. 
  
  
The impact of a notification requirement 
  
In Burke v Stevens the court noted that the severing joint tenant’s actions could be subjected to ethical 
criticism and stated that her stealthy approach to the solution of the problems facing her was not to be 
acclaimed. [63]  It was thus the secret aspect of the unilateral severance which the court found 
objectionable. Professor Mee argues that the solution to this problem is to require the severing joint 
tenant to notify the other joint tenant of the severance. [64]  He also suggests that if a notification 
requirement is introduced the law should be clarified that the Family Home Protection veto will not 
apply in this situation. [65]  A notification requirement would ensure that the non-severing joint tenant 
is not faced with the shock that her right of survivorship has been defeated and would ensure that she 
is aware that there is now an opportunity to dispose of her interest by will. [66]   
  
It is submitted that although notification of the unilateral severance would clearly improve the position 
of the notified joint tenant, it may provoke a married co-owner into instigating premature matrimonial 
proceedings to ensure that her right to occupy the family home is preserved on the death of her spouse. 
Having received notification of the severance, if the requirements for a judicial separation [67]  or a 
divorce [68]  have been satisfied, the non-severing joint tenant is likely to apply for a property 
adjustment order. The court may order that the co-owned property be transferred into her sole name or 
grant an order creating a life estate [69]  or an exclusive right of residence in her favour. [70]  Such 
remedies are only available as ancillary orders to a divorce or a judicial separation and, therefore, the 
notification of unilateral severance may result in a marital atmosphere where the negotiation of a 
mediated separation agreement dealing with the co-owned property is an unrealistic prospect. A 
married joint tenant who wishes to ensure that his share of the property passes to someone besides his 
spouse on his death may have been prepared to agree to a severance subject to an exclusive right of 
residence in favour of his spouse for a specified period of time. 
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If the notified spouse is not in a position to seek a judicial separation or a divorce or chooses not to do 
so, her right of occupation is protected during her husband’s lifetime as the court will not order a sale 
of the family home of married co-owners where one of them applies for such an order pursuant to the 
Partition Acts. [71]  However, once her husband dies, she will have to resort to her succession rights to 
secure her right to occupy the family home. As was discussed earlier, she will not be able to rely on 
s.56 of the Succession Act 1965 to appropriate her husband’s share in the family home if she was not 
residing there when he died. Her husband’s successors will most likely be successful in an application 
for an order for the sale of the premises pursuant to the Partition Acts and she will lose her right to re-
occupy the premises. [72]  The current judicial approach, which prevents a married co-owner from 
unilaterally severing a joint tenancy over the family home and thus preserves the right of survivorship, 
indirectly protects the surviving spouse from being forced into a sale of the premises by the deceased 
co-owner’s successors. 
  
Unmarried co-owners do not have the protection of the Family Home Protection Act 1976 and, if an 
application is made by one of them for an order for sale pursuant to the Partition Acts, it will usually 
be successful. [73]  Therefore, it is not unilateral severance which deprives such joint tenants of their 
right to occupy the family home, but the manner in which the courts currently exercise their 
jurisdiction to grant an order for the sale of co-owned property pursuant to the Partition Acts. The 
position of such co-owners may be improved by the enactment of s.29 of the Land and Conveyancing 
Law Reform Bill 2006. Section 29 replaces the jurisdiction of the courts pursuant to the Partition Acts 
and confers a much broader jurisdiction on the courts to make orders responding to co-ownership 
disputes. On the application of a co-owner, the court is expressly empowered to make an order for 
partition, an order for sale, an order directing that accounting adjustments be made between the co-
owners or such order as it thinks fit in the circumstances of the case, with or without conditions or 
other requirements. Section 29 also grants the courts the power to refuse an order, which may indicate 
that an order for sale will no longer be automatically forthcoming on the application of an unmarried 
co-owner. Perhaps the court will refuse an order for sale if the property is the family home of the 
respondent. It is difficult to predict the factors which will be considered by the courts in exercising its 
jurisdiction under s.29 and the absence of criteria is unfortunate. [74]  It is also unclear whether the 
courts could use this jurisdiction to adjust property interests in a manner similar to that available to 
them on a divorce or a judicial separation. 
  
Although an unmarried joint tenant runs the risk of being presented with an order for the sale of the 
home at any time during the co-ownership relationship, receiving notice that the other joint tenant has 
unilaterally severed the joint tenancy would surely amount to a metaphorical slap in the face and make 
her rights in relation to the home seem very precarious. In the future, an unmarried cohabitant may 
have the option of applying for a property adjustment order [75]  on the breakdown of the relationship 
and it is submitted that a notified joint tenant who qualified for access to such a remedy would be 
likely to avail of it with the hopes of securing her position. At least she would be aware of the factors 
that the court is required to consider in making such an order and the adjustive powers of the courts 
would be beyond doubt. Therefore, such co-owners would inevitably respond to the notification of 
severance in a confrontational and adversarial manner in circumstances where the possibility of an 
agreed severance was never explored. 
  
  
An agreed severance or a court order 
  
It is submitted that unilateral severance, even if notified, is not the most logical manner to deal with a 
breakdown in the relationship between joint tenants. The co-owners originally agreed to hold as joint 
tenants and, regardless of whether unilateral severance was permissible in the past, it makes sense to 
permit a change in the co-ownership arrangement only if they both agree to it. It is, of course, possible 
for co-owners to agree in advance that certain circumstances will effect a severance. For example, a 
co-ownership agreement could include a clause providing that if the joint tenants voluntarily choose to 
live apart, after a certain period of time the joint tenancy will be severed and they will henceforth hold 
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as tenants in common in equal shares or in unequal shares. [76]  Unilateral severance is quite an 
aggressive way to resolve the issues which arise on the breakdown in the relationship between co-
owners. Parties are more likely to be satisfied with agreements they negotiate themselves and the 
abolition of unilateral severance is consistent with a family law approach which aims to encourage 
parties to resolve their disputes before recourse to the courts. 
  
It is only where agreement cannot be reached that an application to dispense with consent to severance 
will be made. The courts will be in a position to examine whether such consent is being unreasonably 
withheld and, if necessary, to impose conditions to protect vulnerable individuals. For example, it may 
be appropriate, to permit a severance but to make it subject to an exclusive right of residence in favour 
of one of the co-owners which will bind the other co-owner’s successor but also preserve his long-
term entitlements. 
  
  
Severance in equity 
  
Section 28(4) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006 provides that nothing in this 
section affects the jurisdiction of the court to find that all the joint tenants by mutual agreement or by 
their conduct have severed the joint tenancy in equity. These two methods of severance were set out 
by Sir Page Wood VC in Williams v Hensman . [77]  If one of the joint tenants dies after their 
relationship has broken down it may be of crucial importance to establish whether there was a 
severance by mutual agreement or by their course of conduct. In Burgess v Rawnsley  [78]  one joint 
tenant orally agreed to sell her interest in the property to the other for a particular price and then 
changed her mind. The court held that the agreement severed the joint tenancy and it was of no 
consequence that it was not in writing or that it was incapable of specific performance. It would seem, 
therefore, that if the joint tenants orally agree that one of them will purchase the share of the other or if 
one of them chooses to exercise a right of pre-emption conferred by an earlier co-ownership 
agreement this will effect a severance in equity. A separation agreement may also contain sufficient 
evidence of the requisite mutual agreement or course of dealing. Although an agreement between the 
separated joint tenants to sell the property does not, of itself, sever a joint tenancy, [79]  if it includes an 
agreement to divide the proceeds equally between them, this effects a severance. [80]  If one of the joint 
tenants dies while they are still negotiating whether the property should be sold or whether one of 
them should buy out the interest of the other, this is not generally viewed as a course of conduct from 
which a severance can be inferred. [81]  If one of the joint tenants institutes proceedings for an order for 
sale and the division of the proceeds and then dies before the case is heard, the courts are unlikely to 
view this as severing the joint tenancy. The typical reasoning employed is that the application could be 
withdrawn by the joint tenant before the case is heard. [82]  In addition, insofar as such an application 
amounts to a declaration by one party to the other that he desires their shares to be held in common, 
the predominant view seems to be that this does not constitute a course of dealing between the parties. 
 [83]  If the joint tenant dies following the institution of proceedings for a property adjustment order the 
courts have pointed out that there is no certainty in relation to the type of order that the court would 
had made if such proceedings had been heard and therefore it would be inappropriate to infer a 
severance. [84]  It is submitted that this approach, which maintains the status quo in the absence of 
evidence of a mutual agreement or course of dealing, sits easily with the prohibition on unilateral 
severance contained in s.28 of the Bill. 
  
The question of property ownership and its occupation naturally has to be revisited on the breakdown 
of the relationship between co-owners. Section 28 of the Bill ensures that a joint tenancy is not severed 
unilaterally or without a court order to ensure the protection of more vulnerable co-owners. Although 
co-ownership disputes will never be eradicated, it is clearly preferable for co-owners to agree to any 
changes in their co-ownership arrangement. To permit unilateral severance is to condone an approach 
which ignores the possibility and the advantages of reaching agreement on how the co-ownership 
arrangement should be changed. 
  
  [1] [Section 28 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006 also invalidates any contract 
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